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Aesthetic discourse harbours complex phenomena that present difficult
challenges to several branches of philosophy. The recent volume under review,
edited by James O. Young, on the semantics of aesthetic judgements attempts to
address some of the most intricate questions. It brings together philosophers of
art and philosophers of language to discuss subjectivism about aesthetic
judgements and the semantics of aesthetic predicates. According to versions of
subjectivism that are relevant with respect to the discussions in the volume,
‘aesthetic properties exist as response-dependent properties and […] make
possible a subjectivist cognitivism about aesthetic judgments’ (p. 4).
Semantically speaking, current subjectivist accounts are typically cast in either
contextualist or relativist terms. According to contextualism, the semantic content
of an utterance of ‘X is beautiful’ contains a judge for whom X is beautiful as 
its constituent part. According to relativism, the judge is not contained in 
the semantic content of the utterance, but is one of the parameters with
respect to which utterances are assessed as true or false. That is, according to
contextualism, an utterance of ‘X is beautiful’ expresses the proposition that X is
beautiful for J (J being a judge) that gets evaluated as true or false with respect 
to possible worlds (and possibly times) and, according to relativism, it expresses
the proposition that X is beautiful that gets evaluated as true or false with respect
to possible worlds and judges (and possibly times). Based on this, contextualism
takes the response-dependent nature of aesthetic properties to consist in 
the notion that aesthetic properties are themselves relative (that is, contain judges
as their constituents), while relativism takes them to consist in the notion that 
the instantiation of aesthetic properties is relative (that is, objects have them only
relative to a judge).
The volume contains nine original essays (apart from the editor’s introduction).
In his introduction (pp. 1–16), Young provides a lucid description of the most
important notions, the most pressing problems, and the most notable
approaches. He also puts every essay in its place within the volume. 
The contributed essays are the following. Louise McNally and Isidora Stojanovic
categorize ‘Aesthetic Adjectives’ (pp. 17–37); Dan López de Sa’s paper is about
‘Making Beautiful Things’ (pp. 28–60); ‘Disputing Taste’ (pp. 61–81) is the subject-
matter of Dominic McIver Lopes’s paper; Tim Sundell explains ‘Aesthetic
Negotiations’ (pp. 82–105); David Davies analyses ‘The Semantics of Sibleyan
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Aesthetic Judgements’ (pp. 106–20); Berit Brogaard proposes ‘A Semantic
Framework for Aesthetic Expressions’ (pp. 121–39); Elisabeth Schellekens dis -
cusses ‘Value Judgements and Standards of Normative Assessment’ (pp. 140–59);
Michael J. Raven raises his voice ‘Against the Semantic Orientation towards
Aesthetic Judgement’ (pp. 160–84); finally, Carl Matheson argues that ‘We Really
Shouldn’t Be Having this Conversation’ (pp. 185–212). I am going to discuss some
of the main ideas presented in these papers. Needless to say, I can barely scratch
the surface of the rich and complex considerations the reader may find in 
the book.
The hallmark of subjectivism in the above sense is the possibility of faultless
disagreements about aesthetic matters. A situation is an instance of faultless
disagreement provided two speakers present positions that are mutually
incompatible, yet neither of them has committed any mistake by adhering to their
respective positions.1 Subjectivism with respect to aesthetic discourse has it that
such situations are available in aesthetic disputes. In saying so, subjectivists bring
aesthetic predicates close to predicates of personal taste like ‘tasty’ or ‘funny’; in
particular, taste properties that are expressed by predicates of personal taste are
usually supposed to be response-dependent (in some way, depending on one’s
overall theoretical approach), and, given subjectivism, the same is claimed to hold
about aesthetic properties. It is widely – though not universally – recognized that
taste disagreements can be faultless. And it seems that if aesthetic predicates
resemble taste predicates in certain vital respects, there should also be faultless
aesthetic disagreements as well. Be that as it may, the majority of contributors
present serious reservations about this position.
I start by summarizing Michael Raven’s considerations. His scepticism regarding
the current debates about faultless disagreements in aesthetics is radical in
a certain sense. Although he does not frame it in this way, it can be said that his
scepticism is based on rejecting the position that was rather forcefully articulated
by semantic minimalists, most notably Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore in
their Insensitive Semantics. They claim that it is not the business of semanticists
to say what the properties they postulate are when specifying the truth-
conditions of judgements; it is the job of metaphysicians to give an explanation
of these properties that would comply with the proposed truth-conditions.2
Extending this view to the realm of aesthetics, semanticists should not bother
Review
1 A classic statement of the idea of faultless disagreements can be found in Max Kölbel,
‘Faultless Disagreement’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2003): 53–73. See
Alison Hills, ‘Faultless Moral Disagreement’, Ratio 26 (2013): 412–13, for an overview of
various definitions of faultless disagreement that can be found in Kölbel’s paper.
2 Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic
Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), chap. 11.
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with what aesthetic properties are, but simply specify the truth-conditions of
aesthetic judgements, and someone else should propose a theory of aesthetic
properties that fits the semanticists’ findings. Raven’s assessment of the dispute
between contextualism and relativism (the latter position labelled by him
‘aesthetic evaluativism’) can be read as a symptom of semantics being
independent from metaphysics. The predominance of what he calls ‘the semantic
orientation’ results in there being ‘little discussion of how to understand the
underlying states of the world which might give rise to the relative truth of an
aesthetic judgement’ (p. 161). This is, according to him, an unwelcome situation,
because it results in approaching aesthetic problems as being dependent on 
the semantics of language. An instance of such a problem is the tension between
the subjectivity of aesthetic judgements and their universality that is contained
in the Humean approach (p. 160). The very possibility of faultless disagreements
can be supposed to speak for the subjectivity of aesthetic judgements as opposed
to their universality (p. 165). However, the dominant semantically oriented
approaches – contextualism and relativism – are not in a position to show that
aesthetic facts are such that they approve of this kind of resolution. Raven shows
that both of these approaches are problematic because of their inability to
preserve the disagreement part of faultless disagreements (though they both are
in a position to preserve the faultlessness part). This is a very interesting point
because it is generally admitted that relativists are able to do full justice to 
the disagreement part.3 The underlying moral of this discussion is that the dispute
between contextualists and relativists in aesthetics would not have arisen if we
had a better understanding of what aesthetic properties are and whether they
really are response-dependent (as both approaches assume) rather than
response-independent. These problems cannot be approached in a satisfactory
way if we stick to the semantic orientation.
But not all the contributions to this collection of essays are to be blamed for
the purely semantic orientation. Elisabeth Schellekens’s paper addresses a meta -
physical question – it contains a direct challenge to the idea that aesthetic
properties are a kind of response-dependent property. Schellekens’s criticism
is particularly concerned with some fitting-attitude theories, particularly 
the sensibility theory originated by David Wiggins.4 According to them, ‘value
properties [such as aesthetic properties] are analysed in terms of certain
3 Needless to say, one may also embark on various attempts in the contextualist literature
that are intended to preserve the disagreement part. In the present volume, this
position is most notably adopted by Dan López de Sa, Tim Sundell, and Dominic McIver
Lopes.
4 See David Wiggins, ‘A Sensible Subjectivism’, in Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998), 185–214.
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correlated responses’ (p. 144), such as emotional responses that are deemed
appropriate with respect to the object in question (where the notion of
appropriateness can reasonably be understood in different ways; see p. 156). Her
main argument against the application of the fitting-attitude theories to the realm
of aesthetics consists in questioning whether the ascription of an aesthetic
property to an object of appreciation as well as the emotional response to the
object in question have good grounds (p. 148). Schellekens argues that there is
‘significant instability and variability of the relation between [aesthetic] property
and [emotional] response’ (p. 154). She describes two kinds of situation to justify
this claim: (i) we may ascribe aesthetic properties to objects independently of any
emotional response, in which case an emotional response cannot be the ground
for ascribing aesthetic properties, and (ii) we may emotionally respond to an
object in a certain way without ascribing to it an aesthetic property that is
supposed to be associated with the kind of response in question. As a result,
justifying ‘an aesthetic judgement merely by appealing to the accompanying
response […] seems far trickier’ (p. 154) than in the case of ordinary taste
judgements.5 She thus suggests considering aesthetic realism as a more suitable
approach to aesthetic properties.
Schellekens’s argument is important in demonstrating that aesthetic properties
cannot be mixed up with some other value properties. For example, properties
of personal taste (like being tasty or being too sweet) seem perfectly fit for 
the response-dependent explication – a cake is too sweet only provided a certain
person finds it too sweet on the basis of their experiences with the cake.
Schellekens is surely right in claiming that an analogous simple explication is not
available for aesthetic properties because two objects of appreciation can both
be found to elicit the same kind of emotional response, but only one of them is
valued as beautiful (on the basis of the elicited response) while the other one
is valued as ugly (also on the basis of the elicited response). Take our response to
the harmony of objects of appreciation as an example: ‘being harmonious can
constitute an aesthetic merit in one context (such as in Impressionist painting)
whilst serving as an aesthetic demerit in another (such as in atonal music)’ (p. 153).
It thus seems that the appreciator’s responses to the objects are unhelpful for
explicating aesthetic properties.6
Review
5 As Schellekens says, we judge that something is disgusting, for example, simply on
the basis of our feelings of disgust (that is, our emotional response) when confronted
with the thing in question.
6 A recent account that rejects the idea of separate treatments of aesthetic properties
and taste properties can be found in Max Kölbel, ‘Aesthetic Judge-Dependence and
Expertise’, Inquiry 59 (2016): 589–617.
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Schellekens’s view coheres with what is claimed by Louise McNally and Isidora
Stojanovic in their joint paper. They argue that aesthetic predicates are not
predicates of personal taste and give an attempt at specifying what makes an
adjective an aesthetic adjective on the basis of linguistic criteria. There is, however,
one important difference: unlike Schellekens, McNally and Stojanovic do not seem
to give up the subjectivist approach to aesthetic properties. They argue that
aesthetic predicates like ‘beautiful’ are multidimensional and non-measurable.
According to them, non-measurability is a source of subjectivity, which may take
either of the following two forms: subjective properties can be either such that
they ‘entail an experiencer’ or ‘imply a positive or negative evaluation on the part
of the speaker’ (p. 23). Predicates of personal taste express properties that are
subjective in the former sense while aesthetic predicates express properties that
are evaluative in the latter sense. This is based on applying several linguistic tests
that consist in assessing the felicity of occurrences of both kinds of predicate
within some linguistic constructions. That is why there is a gap between
predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates, despite both of them being
subjective in a sense. Thus McNally and Stojanovic do not claim that aesthetic
predicates deserve an objectivist treatment, although they suggest that they have
to be approached in a somewhat different way than predicates of personal taste.
A closely related claim is made by David Davies. He argues that aesthetic
predicates expressing so-called Sibleyan concepts are not susceptible to the kind
of treatment that is sometimes applied to predicates of personal taste. In
particular, Davies discusses Andy Egan’s proposal according to which taste
predicates are used by the speakers to self-ascribe dispositions to respond to an
object in a certain way;7 the aim of the disputes about taste is then to motivate
one’s interlocutor to self-ascribe the same disposition. Davies argues that a more
adequate treatment of Sibleyan aesthetic judgements takes them ‘as ascriptions
of properties to entities in virtue of which they affect a certain class of receivers
(those with taste) in certain ways’ (p. 113). Davies further investigates what kind
of properties may correspond to Sibleyan concepts. He claims that they can be
construed either as response-dependent properties or as response-independent
properties. The availability of the response-independent construal can be
motivated by the idea that 
while the analysis of Sibleyan aesthetic concepts makes essential references to ‘a certain
class of receivers’ – those with taste who are either able to detect response-independent
aesthetic properties, or whose responses are constitutive of the concepts – reference to
7 Andy Egan, ‘Disputing about Taste’, in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted
A. Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 247–86.
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the responses of such receivers need not enter into the semantic analysis of judgments
[…]. (p. 115)
Regardless of which construal of Sibleyan concepts is adopted, it seems that
the kind of proposal adopted by Egan is wanting. Nevertheless, Davies admits, at
the very end of the paper, that Egan’s proposal ‘may have a part to play in
a comprehensive account of our aesthetic judgments’ (p. 119).
The idea that the semantics that can be applied to predicates of personal taste
cannot be extended to aesthetic predicates is also defended in Berit Brogaard’s
contribution. She joins Davies in claiming that the semantics of taste predicates
cannot be correctly extended to thick (that is, Sibleyan) aesthetic expressions
such as ‘balanced’, ‘delicate’, and ‘insipid’, which connote both a descriptive
component and an evaluative component – ‘applying the thick expressions
correctly seems to require competence and experience’ (p. 129), which means
that their application cannot be just a matter of subjective preferences or opinions
(as it happens with predicates of personal taste). Brogaard develops this idea
within her special relativist semantics of aesthetic expressions, which is applied
to both thin and thick aesthetic expressions. The crucial role in this approach
is assigned to real – rather than ideal – art critics that are sufficiently trained in
assessing artworks and are properly situated relative to the work under
assessment. Aesthetic standards of the critics (unlike those of the untrained)
are what is relevant for determining the truth-values of aesthetic utterances
(pp. 131–34). Admittedly, this approach provides a more objective framework
than other relativist approaches according to which the truth-values of aesthetic
utterances can be determined relative to anyone’s standards – this would not be
desirable in aesthetics, as Brogaard claims (p. 137). At the same time, however,
aesthetic properties can reasonably be understood as rather close to ordinary
response-dependent properties (for example, personal taste properties) – they
are properties that are dependent on art critics’ responses. Nevertheless, Brogaard
prefers to treat them as self-locating properties that determine extensions only
relative to possible worlds and art critics’ aesthetic standards (p. 136).
The contributions summarized so far are not particularly concerned with 
the phenomenon of faultless disagreements in the realm of aesthetics. It seems
that several of the authors would reject the idea that aesthetic disagreements
could be faultless – this is particularly true of the authors with realist inclinations.
In some other contributions, faultless disagreements are either tacitly assumed
or implicitly tolerated. Nevertheless, three papers in the volume openly deal with
faultless disagreements.
The idea that aesthetic disagreements can be faultless is partly defended in
Dan López de Sa’s contribution. His main intention is dispelling certain worries
Review
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against treating disagreements in aesthetics as faultless (p. 39). Building on David
Lewis’s theory of values,8 he takes values as response-dependent properties that
are grounded in our attitudes of valuing (p. 44). An object can be said to have
a value provided agents are disposed to respond to the object by producing
appropriate attitudes of valuing. This version of contextualism nicely explains why
certain disagreements can be faultless: if one speaker utters ‘X is funny’ and
another responds with ‘X is not funny’, the former says that X amuses her while
the latter says that X does not amuse him – both can be true and thus the speakers
have made no mistake. López de Sa further explains why the speakers can be said
to disagree – despite the fact that the two propositions are fully compatible, it is
argued that the notion of disagreement is flexible, so that it is not required that
the propositions in question be contradictory (p. 48); in fact, contextualists
uncovered several options in which two speakers may disagree without adhering
to contradictory propositions (for example, they may disagree in the sense of
adopting incompatible non-doxastic attitudes or in the sense of negotiating taste
standards). Based on this, contextualism is in a position to explain the existence
of faultless disagreements. What it fails to explain, however, is that we usually
agree that by uttering ‘X is funny’ and ‘X is not funny’ the speakers do express
something contradictory (p. 49). According to López de Sa, this can be explained
provided contextualism is supplemented with the idea that when speakers utter
‘X is funny’ and ‘X is not funny’, respectively, they presuppose that they are
relevantly alike regarding what is funny. Thus, when one utters ‘X is not funny’ by
way of responding to an utterance of ‘X is funny’, one rejects that one is relevantly
alike the speaker of ‘X is funny’ – the former contradicts the latter’s presupposition.
Now, this summary clearly concerns ordinary predicates of personal taste. Is it
possible to extend these considerations to disputes that involve ‘X is beautiful’
and ‘X is not beautiful’? López de Sa makes some initial steps towards enabling
the positive answer ‘without prejudging the final outcome’ (p. 53). He seems to
argue that the difference between taste disagreements and aesthetic
disagreements can be just a matter of degree rather than substance. For example,
it might be argued that aesthetic disagreements are not faultless because it might
turn out that ‘we are all, in fact, relevantly alike’ with respect to the beautiful as
opposed to the funny or the tasty (p. 57); yet this is not essential to the account.
Tim Sundell’s contribution presents a more courageous attempt to show that
no difference between predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates
would call for their separate semantic treatment (see p. 100). His position thus
8 David Lewis, ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63
(1989): 113–38.
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contradicts Brogaard’s, for example. Although he admits that the former are, what
he calls, typically low-pressure predicates while the latter are typically high-
pressure predicates, the difference is not semantically relevant. The latter
predicates put more pressure on the interlocutors to resolve conflicts between
them than the former predicates (this is because the former are based on
standards that are expansive in Sundell’s terms while the latter are based on more
local standards; p. 103). Sundell argues that the treatments according to which
aesthetic predicates, as opposed to predicates of personal taste, require an
objectivist or invariantist explanation cannot withstand the data and that the gap
between the two kinds of predicate is much narrower than it might seem. This is
because some taste disagreements can be as persistent as some aesthetic
disagreements and some aesthetic disagreements can be easily resolved by
pointing to differing standards in the same way as some taste disagreements 
(pp. 87–89; see also pp. 100–101). Building on recent considerations about
metalinguistic uses of certain kinds of predicate – namely, gradable adjectives
that concern ‘how the expressions employed […] should be used’ (p. 94) –9
Sundell takes aesthetic debates to be metalinguistic negotiations that concern
aesthetic standards employed by the speakers. The outcome of such negotiations
is not dictated by the semantics of predicates (p. 96).
Both López de Sa and Sundell defend the view that aesthetic predicates are
semantically close to predicates of personal taste. Sundell explicitly states that
adopting this position cannot be understood as a defence of subjectivism as
opposed to objectivism (realism) (p. 92) – and the position he adopted can be
made consistent with both. As we have seen, other contributions in the volume
adopt views that treat the two kinds of predicates as separate. Several authors
voiced the idea that there must be such a difference between them because
aesthetic predicates cannot be amenable to a subjectivist treatment. Given 
the fact that Sundell shows otherwise – his account convincingly demonstrates
that taste disagreements and aesthetic disagreements are closely similar to each
other in certain vital respects –, such worries can perhaps be dispelled.
Dominic McIver Lopes is  another author who is willing to admit that aesthetic
disagreements can be faultless. His approach, however, differs from the previous
two in that he claims that a substantive difference exists between aesthetically
used predicates and non-aesthetically used (taste) predicates. The difference is
obvious in that ‘aesthetic disputes target objects of aesthetic interest, not simply
traits of disputing parties’ (p. 64); on the other hand, non-aesthetically used taste
predicates just demonstrate the speakers’ preferences. Apart from this crucial
Review
9 Chris Barker, ‘The Dynamics of Vagueness’, Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (2002): 1–36.
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feature of aesthetic disputes, Lopes adds some other features: aesthetic disputes
(i) are settled in the social context of the participants (p. 64), (ii) are persistent 
(p. 65), (iii) contain proper disagreements (p. 66) that (iv) can be faultless (p. 67).
The main aim of Lopes’s paper consists in defending a special version of 
the contextualist semantics of aesthetic judgements. He has it that his approach
is able to do full justice to what he takes to be the core point of aesthetic
disputes – namely, ‘to induce the attribution of aesthetic properties to works in
appropriate genres’ (p. 76), where genres are understood as a certain kind of
social practice which provide frameworks for aesthetic appreciation. He argues
that this view helps to make better predictions about aesthetic disputes than
the competing relativist picture developed, most notably, by Andy Egan.10 What
we have here is a theory that (i) is properly contextualist, (ii) is capable of treating
aesthetically used predicates as being different from ordinary taste predicates,
and (iii) makes room for aesthetic faultless disagreements.
Carl Matheson discusses not the phenomenon of disagreement, but a slightly
different phenomenon that similarly prevents people from agreeing with one
another – namely, (rational) disengagement in science and art or, rather,
theories of art (especially, literary criticism). Invoking the notion of practical
incommensurability, he deals with the question of when it is rationally permissible
for scientists and art theorists to ignore the work of their peers (p. 185). Practical
incommensurability ‘between two theories concerns the difficulty of mutual
comprehension between their proponents’ (p. 191). In science, if the costs of
attempts at comprehending the other’s position are too high compared to the
benefits, it is rational for the scientist to ignore the position. Based on this,
there is no way for the two scientists to come to an agreement. Matheson
shows that this model can be extended beyond science. The same kind of
phenomenon also arises with respect to art criticism. More precisely,  
the extension is rather straightforward provided every literary theorist works
within a single framework – in such a case, it might be disadvantageous for
a theorist to abandon her existing framework for the sake of a new one. 
The analogy with science breaks down, however, with literary theorists who
are pluralists, that is, simultaneously adopt several frameworks, choosing
between them on a case-by-case basis (p. 204). The analogy breaks down
because scientists always work within a single framework (unless they are
forced to abandon one framework altogether and replace it by another that is
deemed to fare better in the pursuit of truth).
10 Andy Egan, ‘Disputing about Taste’, in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted
A. Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 247–86.
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This sketch of the main ideas presented in the volume under review is meant
to show that it contains several positions that highlight the specific nature of
aesthetic predicates compared to ordinary predicates of personal taste, thus
rejecting the subjectivism regarding the semantics of aesthetic predicates.
Generally speaking, when one attributes an aesthetic property to an object one
is not saying anything about oneself (although by making the attribution one
shows their position regarding the object of appreciation). This is not to say, of
course, that one does not make the attribution on the basis of certain aesthetic
standards that one accepts or takes for granted. The situation with respect to
aesthetic predicates is more complicated than the situation with respect to
predicates of personal taste. When one utters ‘This is tasty’, one is thereby
semantically implying that one likes the thing under discussion or that one
undergoes pleasant gustatory experiences upon eating the thing in question.11
When one utters ‘This is beautiful’, however, one does not semantically imply that
one likes the thing under discussion or that one undergoes pleasant aesthetic
experiences upon perceiving the thing in question. (This difference seems to
be even more powerful when attributing Sibleyan properties to objects of
appreciation.) Based on this difference, one’s subjective experiences play
a different role when attributing aesthetic properties than when attributing
personal taste properties. This line of argumentation lies behind the various
challenges collected in the present volume to explicating aesthetic properties in
terms of the response-dependent.
I must say that the volume contains well-researched contributions that are in
a position to shape further debates both in the philosophy of language and in
the philosophy of art. By bringing together philosophers of language and
philosophers of art to discuss various topics regarding aesthetic judgements,
James Young has succeeded in producing a volume of the utmost interest to
a wide audience.
Marián Zouhar
Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences, Comenius University,
Gondova 2, 814 99 Bratislava, Slovakia
marian.zouhar@uniba.sk
Review
11 This position is defended in Marián Zouhar, ‘Conversations about Taste, Contextualism,
and Non-Doxastic Attitudes’, Philosophical Papers 47 (2018): 429–60.
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